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ARE THREEFOLD DAMAGES UNDER THE ANTI-TRUST
ACT PENAL OR COMPENSATORY?
By LAWRENCn VOLD*
I. THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE: CONFLICTING AssmxFpTIoNs.
The anti-trust statute denounces violations of its provisions
as crimes and subjects violators to heavy criminal penalties.'
In addition the anti-trust statute also provides that "any person
who shall be injured in his business or property" by such viola-
tions "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained". 2
When courts are called upon to give effect to this threefold
damage provision in actual cases that currently arise the inge-
nuity of counsel for defendants is often brought into play in the
effort to paralyze its application in the instance. This is
attempted, usually, through some characterization of this provi-
sion as penal, and the assertion that by reason of its penal
character it runs afoul of various other statutory or constitu-
tional provisions in regard to penalties which preclude its appli-
cation to the case in hand. Such tactics have been widely
resorted to in anti-trust cases where assignment or survival of
the cause of action has been involved,3 and in cases where the
application of the statute of limitations to the cause of action
has been in question.4 Analogous problems have arisen under
threefold damages provisions in patent and copyright laws.5
In some recent Nebraska anti-trust litigation similar tactics were
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska Law School; A. B.
1910, LL. B. 1913, S. J. D., 1914, Harvard University; Assistant in
Economics, Harvard University, 1910-11; Professor of Law at Univer-
sity of North Dakota until 1923; has had published Vold on Sales,
3rd Ed. Woodward's Cases on Sales, American Casebook Series, and
numerous articles in law reviews.1U. S. C. A. title 15, Sees. 1-3, 6, 8. State anti-trust acts usually
have corresponding provisions. See for instance, Compiled Statutes
of Nebraska (1929), Sees. 59-801, 59-802, 59-803, 59-810, 59-811, 59-812.
2U. S. C. A. title 15, See. 15. State anti-trust acts usually have
corresponding provisions. See, for instance, Compiled Statutes of
Nebraska (1929), See. 59-818.
' See footnote 49 below, with accompanying text.
,'See footnote 52 below, with accompanying text.
5See footnote 53 below, with accompanying text.
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employed in contending that a provision of the state constitu-
tion rendered such statutes for double or treble damages invalid.6
It is at once apparent that such arguments depend for their
validity upon the preliminary assumption that the statutory
threefold damage provision under attack constitutes a penalty.
The available legal terminology relating to damages and
penalties is very slippery language. In connection with the
reported cases in which courts have struggled with problems
involving the slippery distinctions between "damages" and
"penalties" the following excerpt from the lips of a great jurist
in dealing with another matter is therefore highly pertinent:
"When a court applies a principle you may readily recognize it
and appreciate its application although not entirely content with the
linguistic expression of it in the judicial opinion."7
II. T m PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED IN FAMILIAR PARABLE FoRM.
1. Nathan's Parable to David.
"1. And the Lord sent Nathan unto David. And he came
unto him, and said unto him, There were two men in one city,
the one rich, the other poor.
"2. The rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds;
"3. But the poor man had nothing, save one little ewe
lamb, which he had bought and nourished up: and it grew up
together with, him, and with his children; it did eat of his own
meat, and drank of his own cup, and lay in his bosom, and was
unto him as a daughter.
"4. And there came a traveler unto the rich man, and he
spared to take of his own flock and of his own herd, to dress for
the wayfaring man that was come unto him; but took the poor
man's lamb, and dressed it for the man that was come to him.
"5. And David's anger was greatly kindled against the
man; and he said to Nathan: As the Lord liveth, the man that
hath done this thing shall surely die;
"6. And he shall restore the lamb fourfold, because he did
this thing, and because he had no pity."
(II Samuel, Chapter 12, verses 1-6.)
8 Hompes v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 9 Neb. Sup. Ct. J. 142, 288 N.W. 367
(1939).
"From the address of Charles Evans Hughes before the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, January 16, 1930, in an address
upon the organization and methods of the Permanent Court of Inter
national Justice.
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2. The Punishment and the Restoration Decreed.
So far as it concerns the question of whether threefold
damages are in the nature of a penalty or in the nature of com-
pensation, anti-trust cases, in very condensed form, are vividly
pictured in the foregoing familiar parable from the Old Testa-
ment. The essentials are all there. "The man that hath done
this thing shall surely die." That is the punishment. "And he
shall restore the lamb fourfold." That is the restoration, the
reparation, to the injured party.
3. Fourfold Restoratiom Was Not Penal but Compensatory
for Accumulative Actual Harm Beyond the Range of
Legal Damages.
Is the "restore the lamb fourfold" a penalty, or is it com-
pensation to the injured party? The punishment separately
pronounced was death. The "fourfold" is in terms of " restore".
The two ideas, punishment to the wrongdoer and compensation
to the injured party, are quite distinct. This "fourfold" is
restoration, which is compensation to the injured party. Punish-
ment for the wrongdoer is independently provided for in the
literal language of the parable decree.
Looking at the surrounding facts, too, the correctness of
this view is apparent. To the rich wrongdoer, the poor man's
lamb was just another lamb, for the conversion of which he
might become liable to pay the ordinarily recoverable legal
damages, that is, the market value of the property. To the poor
man here, however, from whom the lamb was taken, this lamb
was a unique chattel. It was the only thing he had. It grew up
with him and his children. It ate of his meat. It drank of his
cup. It was to him as a daughter. To the rich wrongdoer it
might be just another lamb, worth no more than its market
value. For the poor man's loss by the rich, man's wanton taking,
however, the remedy of ordinarily recoverable legal damages,
here the market value, is utterly and wholly inadequate. Under
the circumstances detailed he has suffered accumulative actual
harm intangible and indeterminate, far in excess of the ordi-
narily recoverable legal damages. As a practical expedient for
affording liquidated compensation for this intangible and inde-
terminate accumulative actual harm under such circumstances
the judgment is, according to this parable, that the property
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taken shall be restored fourfold. The fourfold measure of dam-
ages here invoked thus actually serves as a restoratory device
where the facts are such that the single measure of legal damages
is utterly inadequate to accomplish full compensation.
4. The Close Parallel Between the Parable and Cases Under
The Anti-Trust Act.
With but slight changes in terminology, the foregoing
observations on the familiar parable of Nathan and David are
often closely applicable to actions for violation of the anti-trust
act. Here, often, as there, the defendant is a rich and powerful
wrongdoer with an abundance of business establishments. The
plaintiff is by comparison a very poor man, who has but his own
little business to which he devotes his life and from which he
draws his living. Here, as there, the criminal punishment is
separately provided, while here reparation for the injury to
property or business is awarded threefold. To the rich and
powerful defendant with its numerous establishments which
destroys the little plaintiff's only business, the business thus
destroyed may be only one more little business. To the little
plaintiff, however, the victim of the unlawful destruction of the
only business he has from which he draws his living, it is a part
of his very life. As with the lamb in the parable, so with the
little victim's business under the anti-trust act. Redress merely
in terms of the ordinarily recoverable legal damages is utterly
and wholly inadequate to compensate for the intangible and
indeterminate accumulative actual harm inflicted. The parable
adjudges capital punishment on the wrongdoer. To liquidate
compensation for the harm done the parable adjudges "he shall
restore the lamb fourfold". The anti-trust statute provides
severe criminal liabilities to punish the wrongdoer. To liquidate
compensation for the harm done, the anti-trust statute enacts
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
* * * shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained".
In both cases the punitive measures are set out separately.
In both cases the harm to be compensated does not stop
at the ordinarily recoverable legal damages. It includes the.
wider range of intangible and indeterminate accumulative
actual harm wantonly inflicted by the rich and powerful wrong-
doer upon his poor and defenseless victim. In both cases the
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practical device utilized in affording redress where the single
measure of damages is utterly inadequate to accomplish full
compensation is to liquidate compensation for intangible and
indeterminate accumulative harm by quadrupling or trebling
the ordinarily recoverable legal damages.
Accordingly, whatever designation is attached to the four-
fold restoration in the parable decree, the fact remains that the
payment required is liquidated compensation to the injured
party for intangible and indeterminate accumulative harm
actually inflicted. At the same time such additional compensa-
tion, going beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal damages, in
the usual types of cases, is to that extent an additional burden
upon the wrongdoer which in some degree, perhaps, may act
upon him as an additional deterrent from wrongdoing. Only
in that very broad sense is it appropriate to call the fourfold
restoration in this parable decree a penalty. In that very broad
sense of the term penalty, however, every provision requiring
the wrongdoer to make compensation for harm perpetrated is a
provision for a penalty since it involves a burden upon the
wrongdoer to which he would not otherwise be subject, and
which therefore may serve in some degree as a deterrent from
wrongdoing.
III. Tim RAGE OF MEANING FOR THE TERMs "DAMAGES" AND
" PENALTY " %
Arguments which seek to penalize the enforcement of
statutory threefold damage provisions by characterizing them
as penalties call for especially attentive scrutiny with regard to
the assumptions from which their course of reasoning begins.
The term "damages" and the term "penalty" are frequently
used in a wide range of uncertain and varying meanings. This
is true not only of popular speech and of much of the available
legal literature but also of many of the judicial opinions them-
selves. It therefore seems highly desirable, before setting forth
how the threefold damage provision applies to the facts in anti-
trust cases, first to clear the ground for such analysis by clarify-
ing the range of what is signified by the legal terms "damages"
and "penalty" themselves.
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1. Lega2 Damages Ordinarly Fall Far Short of Fu.ll
Compensation for All Actual Harm Perpetrated.
a. Legal Damages and Actual Harm Are
Distinct Concepts.
It is too familiar to require citation of authority that
actual harm may be perpetrated for which the law recognizes
no legal damage. Thus in circumstances where the basis for
liability is negligence, if harm to another results from conduct
which is carried on with due care, no liability to make compensa-
tion results. There is harm but no legal damage.
Slightly more complicated, but equally well established for
ordinary cases, is the common law rule that even in cases where
liability attaches to wrongdoing the defendant is not answerable
for all the harmful consequences, but is answerable only for
such harmful consequences as are proximately caused by his
wrongful act.8
Another limitation on liability short of full compensation
for all the actual harm perpetrated, is found in the traditionally
familiar rules of law relating to the measure of damages. Under
these rules relating to the measure of damages, much actual
harm is, for various reasons of policy, excluded from considera-
tion as legal damage.9
b. Burdens and Expenses of Litigation Ordinarily Are
Not Included in Legal Damages.
Thus it is familiar that under the ordinary common law
rules the burdens and expenses of litigation, beyond the tech-
nically limited court costs, cannot be included as legal damages,
although such burdens and expenses of litigation admittedly
8 A convenient, vivid illustration of how this works out is found in
Bank of Commerce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437, 58 N. W. 84 (1894). In that
case defendant bank wrongfully refused to honor the plaintiff's check.
By reason of this fact it happened that plaintiff was arrested and for
some hours imprisoned, that news of his arrest was prominently dis-
played in the public press, that his creditors in consequence withdrew
credit accommodation up to then extended, thereby requiring him to
make large sacrifices of his property in order to meet his obligations.
It was stated by the court, however, that as the arrest was not a proxi-
mate result of the dishonor of the check, the court not regarding it as
a natural and probable result, the wrongdoer was not responsible for
that and its further harmful consequences.
9 Elaborate discussion of this aspect may be found in Sedgwick on
Damages, 9th ed., vol. 1, Secs. 37 and 38.
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are among the harmful consequences to which the victim was
subjected by the defendant's wrongful act. "Litigation should
be discouraged" is a caption that summarizes various policies
that have been regarded as wise, looking toward the discourage-
ment of frivolous litigation and looking toward keeping the
way open for litigants in serious matters to bring their con-
troversies to court without finding such action burdened with
insuperable costs and expenses. For systematic discussion see
A. L. Goodhart, Costs, in (1929) 38 Yale Law Journal 849. Such
matters as loss of time, additional trouble, inconvenience, annoy-
ance, counsel fees and other expenses of litigation, are burdens
which, win or lose, the winning ordinary litigant in ordinary
cases as a common law matter cannot in this country charge to
the loser as costs.1 0
" "It is a general rule that taxable costs recovered by the prevail-
ing party are considered full compensation for the expense of conduct-
ing the litigation, even if such costs are in fact wholly inadequate.
* * * Notwithstanding this general rule it has been held that there
are certain exceptions."
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Evatt Const. Co., 256 Mass.
404, 152 N. E. 715 (1926) at p. 720 (Crosby, J.).
Among the numerous decisions holding that such items as a com-
mon law matter cannot be included as legal damages, see Lefingwell v.
Gilchrist, 40 Ia. 416 (1875) (inconvenience); Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn.
12 (1884) (expenses of litigation); Jacobson v. Poindexter, 42 Ark. 97
(1883) (loss of time, indirect loss, annoyance, counsel fees); Earl v.
Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873) (counsel fees); Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan.
722 (1879) (feeling of insecurity due to the assault, expenses of litiga-
tion); Bull v. Keenan, 100 Iowa 144, 69 N. W. 433 (1896) (loss of time,
hotel bills, attorney's fees); Boardman v. Marshaltown Grocery Co.,
105 Iowa 445, 75 N. W. 343 (1898) (loss of time, expenses of attending
court, attorney's fees, kindred matters); Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co.
v. Evatt Construction Co., 256 Mass. 404, 152 N. E. 715 (1926) (ordinary
court costs admittedly wholly inadequate to compensate for expense of
litigation); Mathes v. Wherry, 45 S. W. (2d) 700, Texas Civil Appeals
(1932) (expense of litigation, counsel fees); Brown v. Kidwell, 120
Kan. 380, 244 Pac. 236 (1926) (expenses of litigation); Marshaland v.
flindley, 19 La. App. 266, 140 So. 45 (1932) (trouble and expense of
litigation, counsel fees); Shafer Baking Co. v. Greenberg, 51 Ga. App.
324, 180 S. E. 499 (1935) (expenses of litigation, including counsel
fees); Moss v. Winston, 223 Ala. 515, 137 So. 303 (1931) (expense of
litigation, trouble, loss of time, annoyance, counsel fees); Chicago
Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932) (expenses of litiga-
tion).
Among relatively recent Nebraska cases the same principle has
been repeatedly recognized. See TQop v. Palmer, 108 Neb. 850, 189
N. W. 394 (1922); Farmers State Bank v. Aksamit, 112 Neb. 465, 199
N. W. 733 (1924); Smoke v. Pope, 119 Neb. 432, 229 N. W. 330 (1930).
An older case to the same effect on this point is Deering v. Miller, 33
Neb. 654 (1892), saying (Maxwell, J., at p. 657):
"It is evident that such damages are not a legitimate charge against
the plaintiff in error."
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c. Intangible, Indeterminate and Conjectural
Harm: Accumulative Harm.
Outside of the items involving burdens of litigation, the
actual harm perpetrated by the defendants' wrongful act may
involve intangible elements to which no definite measure in
pecuniary loss can readily be applied. Such cases usually fall
beyond the range of the ordinarily recoverable legal damages
on the ground that such harm is too elusive and indeterminate
to be adequately measured by the processes available to the
law. Again, where the harmful effects of the defendants'
wrongful act extend into the future, as in cases of loss of pro-
spective future profits, loss of future earning power, or in cases
of continuing disability or suffering for an undeterminable time
in the future, it is usually held that recovery must be limited
to such damages as can be proved with reasonable certainty.
Many matters of policy converge to product such limitations
on ordinarily recoverable legal damages short of full compensa-
tion for the actal harm perpetrated. Such limitations thus
carry into practical effect in ordinary cases the general idea
that "litigation should be discouraged"."
In one of these Nebraska cases, opinion by Rose, J., Toop v.
Palmer, supra, occurs the following very expressive language:
"There is no statute authorizing a recovery for the expense of
litigation under such circumstances and the general rule is to the con-
trary. An expense of this kind is not an actionable consequence of the
fraud pleaded and it is not regarded as compensatory damage under
former decisions."
In another of these Nebraska cases, Smoke v. Pope, supra, opinion
by Rose, J., appears the following:
"Excessive litigation was caused by defendant's breach of contract
but the law does not seem to authorize a recovery for such claim."1 Among the numerous cases in recent times dealing with these
wider matters of actual harm which as a common law matter are held
not to be recoverable since lying outside of the range of legal damages,
see: A. T. Sterns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. R 82, 52
A. L. EL. 1125 (1927) (damage in indeterminate amount not susceptible
of definite measurement); Bank of Commerce v. Goes, 39 Neb. 437(1894) (imprisonment of drawer resulting from bank's wrongul failure
to honor check); Lisenberry v. St. Louis & Springfield Railway Co.,
184 Ill. App. 395 (probable but not inevitable future pain and suffering
from personal injury); Fitzsimmons v. Chapman, 37 Mich. 139 (1877)
(expected enhancement of real estate values from establishment of a
new prosperous factory in the town failed to materialize when the fac-
tory arranged for turned out to be insolvent); Shurtleff v. Occidental
Building and Loan Assn., 105 Neb. 557, 181 N. W. 374 (1921) (loss of
prospective rents from delay in completion of building, Day, J.); Mis-
sissippi Central Railway Co. v. Hardy, 88 Miss. 732, 41 So. 505 (1906)
(personal injury causing loss of prospects of promotion); Watt v.
Nevada Central Railway Co., 23 Nev. 154, 44 Pac. 423 (1896) (loss of
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The harm thus actually perpetrated but falling outside the
range of ordinarily recoverable legal damages for purposes of
discussion may conveniently be designated as accumulative
harm.12
d. Common Law Modifications of the Mleasure
of Legal Damages.
Even at common law these familiarly applicable restrictive
policies regarding the recovery of damages were occasionally, in
appropriate cases, modified. It is too familiar to need citation
of authority that under the law of libel, published utterances,
libelous per se, require no proof of pecuniary or proprietary
loss in order to justify a substantial recovery.
surplus hay, kept as emergency protection for livestock against hazard
of possible extreme winter, reckoned merely at market value); Boat-
wright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 Fed. (2d) 385 (1931) (loss of employ-
ment through employer's being forced out of business, occasioned by
defendant's breach of contract with plaintiff's employer); Chicago
Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932) (loss of prospective
profits on a world's championship bout between Dempsey and Wills,
when Dempsey repudiated the contract and fought Tunney instead);
Schwartlng v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76, 242 N. W. 273, 81 A. L. R. 769 (1932)(probable future consequences of automobile accident, not rising to
reasonable certainty, Paine, J.); Burkamp v. Roberts Sanitary Dairy,
117 Neb. 60, 219 N. W. 805 (1928) (probable but not certain future pain
and suffering); Silurian Mineral Springs Co. v. Kuhn & Co., 65 Neb.
646, 91 N. W. 508 (1902) (conjectural or speculative damages, caused
by defendant's breach of contract in failing to put on advertising cam-
paign for plaintiff's goods).
The term "accumulative" is used to designate this idea in opinions
from courts of the highest authority. "As said by Mr. Justice Ashhurst
In the King's Bench, and repeated by Mr. Justice Wilde in the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 'it has been held, in many instances,
that where a statute gives accumulative damages to the party aggrieved,
It is not a penal action'." Gray, J., in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S.
657, 668, 36 L. Ed. 1123, 1128, 13 S. Ct. 224 (1892).
"The statute only gives damages as compensation to the party
aggrieved, although it gives accumulative damages." Peck, J., in
Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt. 80 (1869), at p. 85.
The matter is expressed most cogently in the language of counsel
for the plaintiff, as reported in the report of Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt.
80 (1869) at p. 83, as follows:
"The new law, therefore, was manifestly intended to afford greater
encouragement to the sheep breeder, and has simply declared to the
owners of sheep that the owner or keeper of a dog or dogs which worry,
wound or kill sheep, shall make such sheep owners whole, by way of
rendering unto them accumulative damages."
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e. Statutory Modification of the Common Law
Measure of Damages for Burdens and
Expenses of Litigation.
Competent legislation may, of course, change these familiar-
ly applicable common law rules about the measure of damages.
Very familiar, now, are such legislative changes, for appro-
priate cases, making counsel fees and other expenses and burdens
of litigation recoverable as in the nature of costs to be collected
from the wrongdoer. 13
f. Statutory Modification of Common Law Basis
For Liability for Harm Inflicted.
Competent legislation, too, may on occasion modify in
other respects the common law basis for liability for harm which
is ordinarily applicable. Thus, many instances are now at
hand where legislation has replaced liability based upon negli-
gence, with liability without fault, as in workmen's compensa-
tion acts, or in the familiar instances of statuory absolute
liability of railroads for the spread of fire from their engines,
and similar liability of railroads for damage to livestock on
their right-of-way where it is left unfenced. It may be added
parenthetically that while such legislation was still relatively
unfamiliar, lawyers were found to argue learnedly that because
such legislation required payment for damage inflicted by one
upon another without fault on his part, such legislation was
unconstitutional for violation of the due process clause. 14
It is now well established, however, that the legislature may,
on appropriate occasion, shift the basis of liability from fault
in the defendant to infliction of damage on the plaintiff. Such
legislation, as far as it goes, makes the perpetrator of such
conduct in the instance act at his own risk with regard to harm-
ful consequences to others, even though carried on with due
care, instead of permitting him to act to that extent at the
"See, especially, in Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co., 105 Neb. 151, 179 N. W. 503 (1920) (opinion by Flansburg, J.),
affirmed, and on this point specifically approved in Chicago & N.W. R.
Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35, 67 Law. Ed. 115 (1922)(opinion by Taft, C. J.). To the same effect see Marsh and Marsh v.
Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 103 Neb. 654, 173 N.W. 679 (1919), and Daily
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 110 Neb. 481, 194 N.W. 676 (1923).
14 See cases cited in footnote 33 below.
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risk of his victim. In recent decades such legislation for situa-
tions of great hazard or great onesidedness of peril or advantage
has become increasingly frequent and familiar. 15
g. Statutory Modification of Common Law Rules for the
Measure of Legal Damages: Liquidated Damages:
Double or Treble the Legal Damages to Cover
Accumulative Actual Harm Where Ordi-
narily Recoverable Legal Damages
Are Utterly Inadequate.
Again, the legislature may modify the limitations on ordi-
narily recoverable legal damages involved in the familiar com-
mon law measure of damages. Thus for particular situations
involving great inequality or hardship the legislature may
require the wrongdoer to compensate more completely than the
ordinarily applicable rules require for the actual harm inflicted
upon his victim. One familiar item of such legislation, already
adverted to above, is found in statutes which enable the injured
plaintiff in certain types of cases involving great inequality, to
recover reasonable counsel fees as part of his costs. 16 Another
familiar item of such legislation is found in statutes which pro-
vide for recovery of specific sums as liquidated damages in
various instances where the harm inflicted is actual but its
amount is too intangible, elusive and indeterminate to be satis-
factorily reckoned under the ordinary rules regarding the
measure of damages. 1 Still another item of such legislation
modifying the ordinarily applicable limitations of legal damages
is found in occasional statutory provisions for twofold or three-
" For cases involving this broad question reference may be made
to Middaugh v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 114 Neb. 438, 208 N. W. 139 (1926)
(liability of railway, irrespective of negligence, for damage to livestock
on unfenced right-of-way); Missouri Pac. R, Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S.
512, 59 L. Ed. 463 (1885) (same sort of case); C. R. I. & P. R. Co. V.
Hambel, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 607, 89 N. W. 643 (1902) (liability of railway
for damage inflicted upon the person of passengers, irrespective of
negligence, while being transported); Chicago, R. I. & P. R Co. v.
Zernecke, 59 Neb. 689, 82 N. W. 26 (1900), affirmed in 183 U. S. 582
(1902) (liability of railway for damage inflicted upon the person of
passengers, irrespective of negligence, while being transported);
N. Y. Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917) (Work-
men's Compensation Act); St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S.
1, 41 L. Ed. 611, 17 S. Ct. 243 (1897) (liability of railway for damage
from fires communicated from locomotives, irrespective of negligence).
' See footnote 13 above.
1 Sedgwick on Damages, 9th ed. (1912) Vol. 1, Secs. 387-427.
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fold damages.' 8 For fact situations where the ordinarily recov-
erable legal damages are utterly inadequate in that they fall far
below full compensation for the accumulative, actual harm
inflicted, such twofold or threefold damage legislation provides
a reasonable and practicable method for awarding liquidated
compensation. In such cases the ordinarily recoverable legal
damages afford a definite and measurable base in proportion to
which liquidated compensation for the further intangible, inde-
terminate accumulative harm can be awarded in the instance
without caprice or prejudice by the simple process of computa-
tion, according to the terms of the statute, twofold, threefold,
etc. This is an aspect of the realities which has been much
obscured in ordinary, loose, general discussion, through pre-
occupation with the idea that treble damage provisions are
comparable to exemplary damages, which in turn, are loosely
thought of as being merely punitive in character, and assessable
without limit according to the jury's feeling of ethical indigna-
tion in the instance. See for insance: Haines v. Schultz, 50
N. J. L. 481, 14 Atl. 488 (1888). It is readily apparent in the
light of this analysis of the realities regarding statutory two-
fold or threefold damage provisions that in this connection much
of the ordinary observations on penalties and exemplary dam-
ages is utterly beside the point.
The case in the available reports which most effectively dis-
cusses this distinctive aspect of the problem in connection with
double damages seems to be the case of Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt.
80 (1869). In that case a statute was applied which provided
for double damages against owners of dogs killing sheep. Coun-
sel for defendant objected that it was a penalty.
The matter is neatly summarized in the argument of counsel
for the plaintiff in the following sentences. "The old law
afforded very limited encouragement for wool growing, inas-
much as the owner, if compelled to resort to the courts for his
remedy against the owner of the dog, would in the end have
barely enough left of his verdict to pay his counsel. The new
law, therefore, was manifestly intended to afford greater
encouragement to the sheep breeder, and has simply declared to
the owners of sheep that the owner or keeper of a dog or dogs
28 See footnote 2 above, and footnotes 19 and 20 below.
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which worry, wound or kill sheep, shall make such sheep-owners
whole, by way of rendering unto them accumlative damages."19
The court, by Peck, J., in approving this view of the matter
expressed itself as follows: ". . . the remedy is confined to the
party injured, and not as a penalty, but as compensation ....
the statute only gives damages as compensation to the party
aggrieved, although it gives accumulative damages. "20
Th.e same idea is expressed, though in language involving
more obscurity, in the following:
"It has been said that the distinction between exemplary damages,
and damages given as special or extraordinary compensation, is one of
words merely, and the effect of allowing the former is the same as that
produced upon the theory of compensation when this is extended to
cover injury beyond the pecuniary loss." (One of the varying defini-
tions of exemplary damages appearing in Bouvier's Law Dictionary-
Rawle's Revision, 1897).
While analytical discussion of twofold and threefold damage
provisions is too frequently rendered obscure by loose and indis-
criminate use of the word "penalty" in such discussion, care-
ful attention to the intangible elements of actual harm, which
are present in many situations, greatly clarifies the realities
involved. Where the intangible elements of actual harm go far
beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal damages, it is readily
apparent that redress confined to ordinarily recoverable legal
damages is utterly inadequate to afford full compensation. Pro-
visions for threefold damages in such cases pertain exclusively
or predominantly to the nature of provisions for liquidated
compensation for actual harm inflicted. Such is conspicuously
the case in connection with violations of the anti-trust act where
destruction of another's going business is in question, the actual
harm inflicted in such cases consisting predominantly in the
destruction of established, intangible, advantageous relations
with others and loss of prospective future profits rather than in
direct injury to the person or destruction of tangible property.
It may be added that the term "actual damage" as used in
judicial opinions or in briefs of counsel, is frequently too
ambiguous to be dependable with regard to the range of meaning
involved. All too frequently the term "actual damages" may
be used in some sense that is in substance opposed to fictional or
spurious or unreal damages. Without further explanation such
"Reported at 42 Vt. at p. 83.
Reported at 42 Vt. at pp. 84-85.
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use of the term "actual damages" fails to indicate whether it
has reference merely to ordinarily recoverable legal damages, or
owhether it includes the much wider range of accumulative actual
harm which is in fact inflicted upon the victim by the wrong-
doer.
2. The Term "Penalty" Has Many Varying Meanings
and Lorgely Overlaps the Term "Damages".
The varying shades of meaning attached to the term
"penalty" are very numerous. Even leaving out of the discus-
sion corporal punishments and confining attention to the pay-
ment of sums of money, the term "penalty" has been frequently
applied in popular and legal usage in from half a dozen to a
dozen different gradations of meaning. Among the most
familiar of these are the following:
a. Payment By the Wrongdoer To the State, Exacted
as Retribution for a Crime Committed. Here
the Underlying Idea is Vengence.
"And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for
life,
"Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,
"Burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."
-Exodus, Ch. 21, Verses 23-25.
"And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor; as he hath
done, so shall it be done to him.
"Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he hath
caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again."
-Leviticus, Ch. 24, Verses 19-20.
Mayor Visits Punishment. Getting Even With Firemen Who Sued
The City" (headlines of news item in the Lincoln Morning Journal,
February 10, 1939, relating to certain inconveniences, tasks and econo-
mies imposed upon firemen by the mayor of an eastern city in retalia-
tion for their action against the city for alleged arrears in pay).
b. Payment By the Wrongdoer To the State in Cases of
Crime, Exacted By the Law as a Warning
Deterrent To Others.
"In the municipal law of England and America, the words 'penal'
and 'penalty' have been used in various senses. Strictly and primarily,
they denote punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and
enforced by the state, for a crime or offense against its laws * * *.
"* * * Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing
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punishment for an offense committed against the state, and which, by
the English and American constitutions, the executive of the state has
the power to pardon."'"
Another leading case in the Supreme Court of the United States
touching upon the range of meaning covered by the term "penalty,"
Is the case of Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 44 Law. Ed. 109, 20 Sup. Ct.
62 (1899). In this case a federal statute was in question which pro-
vided for recovery of damages for infringement of copyright of a play
for public performance in the amount of $100 for the first performance
and $50 for each additional performance and as much more as might
be proved. In the litigation that resulted the contention was made
that these provisions were provisions for a penalty. The court, how-
ever, rejected these contentions and regarded the provisions in the
instance as amounting to provisions for liquidated damages. The
opinion of the court, Peckham, Justice, contains the following:
"Although punishment, in a certain and very limited sense, may be
the result of the statute before us so far as the wrongdoer is concerned,
yet we think it clear such is not its chief purpose, which is the award
of damages to the party who had sustained them, and the minimum
amount appears to us to have been fixed because of the inherent dif-
ficulty of always proving by satisfactory evidence what the amount is
which has been actually sustained."
"The word 'penalty' is also properly used in a narrower sense, to
Indicate a sum of money exacted because of a wrong to the state."
2'
c. Exemplary Damages at Jury's Discretion.
Payment by the wrongdoer to the individual aggrieved in
an amount to be assessed by the jury, exacted by law in certain
types of aggravated cases for the multiple purposes of making
full compensation to the injured party for actual harm, going
beyond ordinary legal damages, providing for recovery of com-
pensation for costs and expenses involved, and providing a
deterrent example to others, or even containing an element of
retributive vengeance. This is the type of burden usually
indicated by the terms "exemplary" or "punitive" or "vindica-
tive" damages, which indeed, is itself used in varying shades of
meaning.
"A penalty as the word is used in this section is a sum of money
exacted as a punishment for civil wrong as distinguished from compen-
sation for the loss suffered by the injured party.""
"Exemplary Damages. Those allowed as a punishment for torts
committed with fraud, actual malice, or deliberate violence or oppres-
sion.
"In nearly all of the states, in such cases, the jury are not confined
to a strict compensation for the plaintiff's loss, but may, in assessing
2 Huntington v. Attrlll, 146 U. S. 657, 666-667, 36 L. Ed. 1123, 1127,
13 S. Ct. 224 (1892) (Gray, J.).
-"American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Sec.
611, comment c.
"American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Sec.
611, comment a.
K. L. J.-3
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damages, allow an additional sum by way of punishment for the wrong
done. This allowance is termed 'smart money' or 'exemplary', 'vindic-
ative' or 'punitive' damages."'
"As said by an eminent court with regard to exemplary damages,
such a procedure is 'a sort of hybrid between a display of ethical Indig-
nation and the imposition of a criminal flne'." 5
"Finally, the seeming inconsistency of assessing the exemplary
damages as a punishment and awarding the benefit of them to the
plaintiff and not to the state may be justified by considerations already
mentioned; namely, the advantage of furnishing an incentive for this
sort of private prosecution of wrongs which the public prosecutor would
ignore, and by the fact that exemplary damages are likely to approxi-
mate recompense for the expenses of litigation (over and above tax-
able costs) for which the plaintiff otherwise would not be reimbursed."4
"Punitive damages * * * are awarded to the injured party as
a reward for his public service in bringing the wrongdoer to account",,
See subdivisions "d" and "g" below (pp. 132, 134) for
other types of redress to which the description of "exemplary
damages" is occasionally loosely applied.
d. Statutory Incentive Liability: Statute Penalty.
In addition to the ordinarily available common law liabil-
ity for loss sustained through another's wrongdoing, statutes
may in various instances provide for payment by the -wrongdoer
to the aggrieved party of certain additional fixed sums, or of
additional amounts proportioned on some specified basis to the
loss sustained. The additional sums tlus recoverable have often
been described as statutory penalties, collectible by the parties
aggrieved. Such superadded liability, enforceable in favor of
the injured party in a civil action affords a convenient and
practical method of securing enforcement of the statutory policy
to suppress such wrongdoing. The superadded liability thus
furnishes the added incentive to avoid the wrongdoing in
question. 28 It may be accurately described as statutory incentive
liability.
2 4Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's ed. 1897), Vol. 2, p. 391.
2 Grand Island & W. C. ML Co. v. Swinbank, 51 Neb. 521, 71 N. W.
48 (1897), Irvine, C., at p. 526, quoting from Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J.
Law 481.
-"McCormick on Damages (1935), at p. 278.
' Neal v. Newberger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929) at p. 863
(Anderson, J.).
2"The power of the state to impose fines and penalties for a viola-
tion of its statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the
mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private
party, or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made
of the amounts collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion.
The statutes of nearly every state of the Union provide for the increase
of damages where the Injury complained of results from the neglect of
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Such statutory incentive liability may readily be recognized
as lying somewhere in the intermediate range between exemplary
damages at the jury's discretion and statutory double or treble
damages as liquidated compensation for accumulative actual
harm going beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal damages.
duties imposed for the better security of life and property, and make
that Increase In many cases double, in some cases treble, and even
quadruple the actual damages. And experience favors this legislation
as the most efficient mode of preventing, with the least inconvenience,
the commission of injuries."
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 511, 25 Law.
Ed. 463 (1885) (Mr. Justice Field).
"Experience teaches that to secure adherence to rates, even when
lawfully prescribed, it Is essential that deviations from them be dis-
couraged by adequate liabilities and penalties."
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 348, 57 Law. Ed.
1507, 1510, 33 Sup. Ct. 961 (1913) (Van Devanter, J.).
"The general rule to be gathered from this extended review of the
cases is that common carriers engaged in the public business of trans-
portation may be grouped in a special class to secure the proper dis-
charge of their functions, and to meet their liability for injuries
inflicted upon the property of members of the public in their perform-
ance, that the seasonable payment of just claims against them for
faulty performance of their functions is a part of their duty, and that a
reasonable penalty may be imposed on them for failure promptly to
consider and pay such claims, In order to discourage delays by them."
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260 U. S.
35, 43, 44, 67 Law. Ed. 115, 122, 43 S. Ct. 55 (1922) (Taft,
C. J.).
'The result will not be changed, however, though the increment
to the judgment be classified as penal, if the amount is not immoderate.
* * * Repeated judgments of this court bear witness to the truth
that such a tax upon default is not put beyond the pale by calling it a
penalty. * * * This court upheld the additional exaction though
describing it as a penalty. The statute did no more than provide 'a
reasonable incentive for the prompt settlement without suit of just
demands,' and demands 'of a class admitting of special legislative treat-
ment' * * * There was apprQval of the statement of the court
below that 'the penalty, in case of a recovery in court' would operate
'as a deterrent of the carrier in refusing to settle just claims, and as
compensation of the claimant for * * * trouble and expense.'"
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566, 573, 574, 78
Law. Ed. 987, 991 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
"It Is the exercise by the state of its police power. It is based upon
principles of public policy, and it was intended as an incentive to stock-
holders of corporations to see to it that the law of the state was obeyed;
and If they neglected their duty In that regard, to punish them for such
neglect."
Globe Pub. Co. v. State Bank of Nebraska, 41 Neb. 175, 181,
193, 59 N. W. 683 (1894) (Ragan, C.).
See also decisions which without extended discussion have upheld
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e. Contract Penalty.
Payment of a specified lump sum by the contract breaker
to the individual aggrieved may be provided for by contract
between the parties for the double purpose of not only liquidat-
ing damages from prospective breach of contract but also of
imposing an additional burden upon the promisor in order to
deter him from breaking his contract. This is the type of burden
commonly indicated by thte expression "a contract penalty."
Such a provision seeks by contract to provide additional liability
as incentive to performance. A sort of "contractual incentive
liability" is sought. It is often a difficult and close matter of
construction of contracts to distinguish between clauses for
contract penalties and clauses merely providing for liquidated
damages. 29
f. Contract Liquidation of Damages.
Payment of a lump sum by the contract breaker to the
individual aggrieved may also be contracted for as liquidated
damages in amount fixed by previous contract as the agreed
estimate of the amount of damage where the extent of harm is
indeterminate and not readily susceptible of exact measurement
in pecuniary terms.30
g. Twofold or Threefold Damages to Liquidate
Compensation for Accumulative Harm.
Payment by the wrongdoer to the aggrieved party, may be
required by law, in twofold or threefold the ordinarily recover-
able legal damages, serving the purposes of providing liquidated
compensation for costs, expenses and burdens of litgation and
for accumulative indeterminate, intangible, but actual harm
beyond the limits of ordinarily recoverable legal damages. Such
extended liability for the burdens actually brought about by the
and applied the "statutory waiting time penalty" under the Nebraska
Workmen's Compensation Act.
U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Wickline, 103 Neb. 21, 170 N. W. 193 (1918).
Abel Construction Co. v. Goodman, 105 Neb. 700, 181 N. W. 713(1921).
Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303, 187 N. W. 919(1922).
Lincoln Gas & E. L. Co. v. Watkins, 113 Neb. 619, 204 N. W. 391(1925).
2 Sedgwick on Damages, 9th ed., Vol. 1, Sees. 389-427.
"* See footnotes 12, 19, and 20 supra.
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wrongdoer's misconduct may in such cases also have a deterrent
effect on the wrongdoers.3 1
In loose discussion, however, in which tile distinction
between ordinarily recoverable legal damages and accumulative
actual harm is ignored, such twofold or threefold damage pro-
visions are sometimes loosely characterized as in the nature of
exemplary damages.3 2
See also, on this point the alternative definition of exemplary
damages from Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoted above at page
- of the present paper, in the discussion of threefold damages as
compensation for accumulative harm.
h. Absolute Liability.
Requiring the perpetrator of damage to the aggrieved party,
to pay compensation for harm actually caused to the extent of
legal damages, even though the defendant acted throughout with
due care, has at times been described as a penalty. Absolute
liability for the legal damages caused is in such, cases also a
strong incentive to the use of great care, the actor acting at his
own risk instead of acting at the risk of his victims. Requiring
a party thus to answer for legal damages inflicted upon others
by his conduct, even though perpetrated without fault, consti-
tutes a burden imposed upon activity in such cases which has
been frequently asserted to penalize lawful activity.33
i. Liability Based on Fault.
Payment by the wrongdoer to the aggrieved party, of
compensation for legal damages caused by willful or negligent
conduct has not infrequently been described in terms of punish-
ment. Even the burden of answering for the legal damages of
careless conduct is to that extent a deterrent against careless-
ness, and to that extent can be loosely described in the language
" See footnotes 12, 19, and 20 above.
""There can, of course, be no pretense that section 7 of the Sher-
man Act provides a penalty. It awards civil damages, which are made
exemplary by virtue of being trebled."
United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232
Fed. 574 (1916) at p. 577 (Ward, Cir. J.).
Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55 (1875), at p. 57
(Breese, J.); Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431
(1911), at pp. 441, 443 (Werner, J.); Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Outcalt,
2 Colo. App. 395, 31 Pac. 177 (1892).
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of a penalty for carelessness, even though that penalty for care-
lessness consists merely in making compensation for legal
damages caused thereby. It is remarkable how readily the
language of punishment is loosely applied to liability to com-
pensate for legal damages, even in the serious writings of judges
and high reputed legal authors.34
That, in loose use of language, even parliamentary statutes
have sometimes used "punishment" as a term referring to
compensation; see Statute, 4 Edw. III, c. 7, relating to survival
of causes of action.35
j. Disadvantage or Handicap.
Disadvantage or handicap consequent upon a certain type
of event or course of action is not infrequently referred to
loosely as a penalty. 6
" "Any recovery of damages may well be said to be 'in the nature of
a penalty' where the defendant is required to pay for his breach of
duty."
Standard Oil Co. v. Roxana Petroleum Corporation, 9 Fed.
(2d) 453 (1925) at p. 456 (Fitzhenry, Dist. Judge).
"An increase reasonably adequate to compensate for these losses
will impose sufficient punishment to satisfy the statute."
Muther v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 21 Fed. (2d) 773 (1927)
(a patent infringement case) at p. 780 (Brewster, Dist.
Judge).
"The recovery of attorneys' fees is a penalty."
Schafer Baking Co. v. Greenberg, 51 Ga. App. 324, 180 S. E.
499 (1935) at p. 501 (Broyles, C. J.).
"Liability for taxable costs is ordinarily considered sufficient pun-
ishment for unfounded claim or meretricious defense."
Boardman v. Marshaltown Grocery Co., 105 Iowa 445, 75 N. W.
343 (1898) at p. 345 (Deemer, C. J.).
"The punishment for waste committed was, by common law and
the statute of Marlbridge, only single damages; except in the case of a
guardian, who also forfeited his wardship by the provisions of the great
charter; but the statute of Gloucester directs that the other four species
of tenant shall lose and forfeit the place wherein the waste is com-
mitted, and also treble damages to him that hath the inheritance."
Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 2, p. 283.
I "Whereas in times past executors have not had actions for the
trespass done to their testators, as of the goods and chattels of the
same testators carried away in their life, and so such trespasses have
hitherto remained unpunished; it is enacted that the executors in such
cases shall have an action against the trespassers to recover damages
in like manner as they, whose executors they be, should have had if
they were in life."
Quoted as found in Moore v. Backus, 78 Fed. (2d) 571, 101
A. L. R. 379 (1935) at p. 383.
16 "For the wages of sin is death." * * *
Epistle to the Romans, chapter 6, verse 23.
"Punishment follows every violation of nature's laws."
(From an old book on physiology.)
"Last year I think I earned a bonus (for sales volume) of some-
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3. Unexamined Assumptions as to the Range of Meaning for
These Terms May Vitiate the Argument Built Thereon.
In the light of th.e foregoing groupings and illustrations it
requires no argument to demonstrate that both the term "dam-
ages" and the term "penalty" have various radations of mean-
ing. Iu its looser and wider meaning the term "penalty" is
frequently and readily applied to describe every situation where
liability to make compensation for harm is imposed by the law.
In other words, in its wider meanings the term "penalty" com-
pletely overlaps the term "damages." Accordingly, where a
legal argument is based upon the contention that a certain
statutory provision is invalid because it is a "penalty", the
soundness of the argument will depend largely upon what mean-
ing for the word "penalty" is adopted therein. Without more
closely defining its terms such an argument can readily become
merely an exercise in obscurity, sliding unnoticed from one
meaning of the term to another. Again, without more closely
defining its terms, such an argument can become an exercise
which merely assumes tke conclusions sought, simply adopting
without explanation that range of meaning for the term which
will most readily point toward the desired result.
IV. SPECIA FACTS CHARACTERISTIC OF VIOLATIONS OF
ANTI-TRUST LAWS.
1. Great Inequality Between Violators and Victims.
Both the history and the current practical applications of
anti-trust legislation are filled with instances where large and
powerful combinations or monopolies deliberately seek to destroy
smaller and weaker competitors, such destruction being one of
the indispensable steps toward establishing monopolistic control
of the market to the prejudice of the public. Anti-trust litiga-
tion thus regularly presents the spectacle of the little victim
who is pitted against the large and powerful combination whose
marketing practices are tending toward monopolistic control.S'
thing like, oh, $150 to $180, something like that. There were penalties
if I didn't make the gross profits, if I didn't operate my business on a
profit business (basis) and so on and so forth."
(From testimony of Wallace G. Sabine, using the term
"penalty" as the opposite of "bonus," during the trial of a
certain case. Hompes v. Goodrich Co., 9 Neb. Sup. Ct. J. 142
288 N.W. 367 (1939), bill of exceptions, p. 12.)
27 One of the most familiar examples presented in the reports is
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2. Wanton Character of the Violations.
Anti-trust cases where defendants are guilty frequently
present living flesh and blood instances where unlawful acts
have been intentionally perpetrated by a large-scale powerful
organization in direct violation of the anti-trust statute for the
purpose of driving the small plaintiff out of business. Destroy-
ing another's business is destroying his means of living. With-
out here enlarging upon the public and social aspects of the
monopolistic problem that is presented when competition is
crushed out, it suffices to say for the present discussion as the
competitor is crushed out his means of earning a living are
destroyed.
Where a competitor is thus ruthlessly crushed out, not by
legitimate competitive activity in giving better service to the
public, but by forbidden marketing practices, intentionally and
speeifically directed toward his destruction, the legal justification
for the competition fails. The anti-trust law here applies.
Victims of such practices have an expressive name for it in the
term "commercial murder," as expressed by a victim in a news-
paper interview appearing a number of years ago in a newspaper
in Boston, Massachusetts. Even judges in appellate courts have
likened such practices to "highway robbery." See, Elliott,
Justice, in Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909).
The same idea is expressed in very poetical form in
Shakespeare's:
"You take my life when you do take the means whereby I live"
(the Merchant of Venice, Act. IV, Scene 1, Shylock speaking).
While leaving legitimate competitive activity untouched,
the anti-trust act denounces such intentionally perpetrated com-
mercial murder as unlawful. That such deliberate commercial
murder was carefully carried into effect by means that were
made to look like legitimate competitive activity in no wise
changes the reality of the facts. As readily could it be said
that deliberately killing a victim by giving him doses of poison
is not murder because under certain other circumstances appro-
priate doses of such poison might be properly administered
as medicine for the purpose of curing disease. Even at common
law, acts in the forms of ordinary commercial competition
found in Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371, 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 263 (1911).
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afforded no justification for the destruction wrought where
the sole motive was to destroy another. The familiar doctrine
against spite fences is given appropriate application to cases of
competition. 38
Under the anti-trust laws, as under the common law, the
court will look through the forms to the substance to ascertain
what the actual facts are with regard to the acts complained of.
That acts which are done for the purpose of driving another
out of business are given the ordinary forms of legitimate com-
petitive activity does not save them from scrutiny as to their
real character.39
3. The Harm Perpetrated: Intangible Elements: Accumulative
Harm: Danger of Harassment for the Future.
According to the damage section of the anti-trust act any
person "who shall be injured in his business or property" by
violations of the statute "shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained." To the extent that conduct violative of the
anti-trust statute succeeds, the injured victim's business is
destroyed. To the extent that his business is destroyed the
victim's means of living are destroyed. It is informative to
analyze briefly the elements involved therein.
a. Accumulative Intangible Harm.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the destruction of
a going business does not directly involve either the taking or
the destruction of the victim's tangible physical property.
Destruction of the victim's business is destruction of his relation-
ship with others which enables him advantageously to utilize his
tangible assets. It involves the destruction of his business good
will, loss of his financial credit, loss of his current profits in a
going business, destruction of his opportunities for creating
valuable and profitable relations with others in the future. Such
deliberate destruction of his going business can render the
victim's tangible assets relatively valueless, as only by the use
8 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909); Van Horn
v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. Law 284, 20 At. 485, 10 L. R. A. 184 (1898);
Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co. 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911).
"Amerlcan Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 Fed. (2d) 763
(1930), at p. 767 (Evans, Circ. J.).
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in advantageous relations with others can such assets realize a
financial return in business enterprise. Idle plant and machin-
ery, instead of helping him to earn his living, drain away the
victim's resources through unavoidable overhead taxes and
expenses, loss of interest, and depreciation. Much more harmful
in the aggregate then the present loss of value on tangible assets,
however, is the destruction of the victim's opportunities for the
future. A going business stays alive and thrives only through
maintenance of continuing advantageous relations with others.
Destruction of the victim's business is the destruction of these
intangible advantageous relations. Once destroyed, such advan-
tageous relations with others are difficult and expensive to
rebuild. Opportunities for the future in the practical affairs of
business depend in large measure on the continuing existence
of such advantageous relationships. With the destruction of the
business the victim's opportunities for the future are thus
largely wiped out. Without doors of opportunity for the future,
attempts at a new start are foredoomed to tragic failure. Fur-
thermore, when the doors of opportunity for the future are
slammed shut, hope withers and dies, while despair crushes the
human spirit. Without the beacon of hope to spur human
ambition, activity is made futile. Productive effort for the
future is destroyed by cutting off the hope and opportunity for
its successful exercise.
Most of these items just referred to are intangible. They
are elusive. They cannot be adequately measured in terms of
pecuniary loss. They are nevertheless the elements that give
worth to the tangible assets, and make such tangible assets
capable of bargain and exchange resulting in measurement in
terms of monetary value. It is familiar law that a business,
though intangible, is itself a species of property entitled to
legal protection. Even the damage section of the anti-trust
statute speaks of injury "in his business or property." In the
realm of values, the intangible elements are to the tangible
elements like the spirit to the body. Without the living spirit
the body would be but a corpse. Though the intangible elements
are largely too elusive for measurement in monetary terms, their
reality and supreme importance in the world of practical affairs
are readily recognizable.
It requires but a slight orientation in the facts of anti-trust
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cases to recognize that such cases, involving the deliberate
destruction of the victim's business, involve a very large but
elusive range of tragic destruction of such intangible elements.
These intangible elements are not reducible to the definiteness
required for the ordinarily applicable measure of legal dam-
ages. Destroying another's business is thus the destroying of
the victim's means of living, through destruction of his advan-
tageous relationship with others in his business setting. Even
though the victim's tangible assets may remain physically un-
touched, it is abundantly clear that such misconduct involves a
very large range of actual harm to the victim for the full redress
of which the ordinary measure of legal damages is wholly
inadequate.
b. Danger of Harassment for the Future.
One special aspect of the indeterminate accumulative harm
to which a little plaintiff is exposed if he sues for violations of
the anti-trust act by the large-scale, monopolistically inclined
wrongdoer, is harassment thereafter in all his legitimate busi-
ness efforts. Harassment can take many forms. Most fre-
quently it will be carried out under the form of legality. It
will take the form of denial of dealership, refusal of credits,
boycott efforts in various directions, many of which will be
difficult to detect and others of which will be difficult to challenge
successfully from the standpoint of their legality. Accordingly,
one of the serious risks that is involved for plaintiffs in anti-trust
cases, is the risk of harassment and exposure to boycott tactics
in his business relations thereafter. One of the items of his
burdens of litigation, therefore, if he seeks to enforce his legal
rights by resort to legal proceedings, is found to be the risk of
harassment and boycott tactics to which such litigation exposes
his business future.4 0 Though the keeping of blacklists in such
matters may not be countenanced by law, it is impossible as a
4 Among illustrations from the reports may be mentioned the fol-
lowing: B. F. Goodrich Co. v. American Lakes Paper Co., 23 Fed. Supp.
682 (1938); U. S. v. International Fur Workers Union, 100 Fed. (2d)
541 (1938); Krigbaum v. Sparbaro, 138 Pac. 364, 23 Cal. App. 427
(1913); Parker Rust Proof Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 Fed. (2d) 502
(1928).
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matter of fact to prevent the practical operation of memory in
such cases.
Accordingly, one of the items of compensation for which
the successful plaintiff in anti-trust cases can lay rational
claim, is the risk of harassment and boycott tactics against
which the threefold damages provide to some extent compensa-
tion and boycott insurance.
c. Illustration of Inadequacy of the Measure of Ordinarily
Recoverable Legal Damages in Anti-trust Cases:
Threefold D a m a g e Provision Affords
Liquidated Compensation for Accumu-
lated Harm.
Specific illustration of how utterly inadequate is the measure
of ordinarily recoverable legal damages to cover full compensa-
tion for the entire harm perpetrated in anti-trust cases is
readily drawn from the facts appearing of record in a recent
case. The measure of legal damages for violations of the anti-
trust act had already in an earlier case been announced as
follows:
"The measure of damages for the interruption or destruction of a
going concern is the loss of profits proved to a reasonable certainty." "
Advised of this rule of law through familiarity with the
earlier decision counsel for the plaintiff in the trial of the pend-
ing case412 accordingly procured the introduction of evidence of
loss of profits in the business only for that interval during the
years 1933-1936 during which the violations were going on.
Nothing was brought in as to interruption of business by the
necessity of attending court, loss of time, inconvenience and
expense of litigation. Nothing was brought in as to loss of
future profits, prospective profits which would have been in all
probability realized for subsequent years had there been no
violations with the resulting litigation. Nothing was brouht in
about loss of goodwill and business confiections. Nothing was
,nMarsh-Burke Co. v. Yost, 98 Neb. 523, 532-533, 153 N. W. 573
(1915). See also footnote 43 infra.
42Hompes v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 9 Neb. Sup. Ct. J. 145 288 N.W. 367
(1939).
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brought in about loss of business reputation in the trade from
engaging in litigation against one of the most powerful organiza-
tions in that line of trade. Nothing was brought in about the
burden of anxiety involved in the situation in which the plain-
tiff had been put by the defendants' conduct; given the choice,
as it were, of being crushed out quietly or of fighting back and
being subjected to possible reprisals or being worn out with con-
tentions litigation for a long time with a very powerful organiza-
tion, carried through the time-consuming and expensive process
of appeal to the highest courts.
These matters, though real, are all more or less elusive and
indeterminate. Some of these items also involve an element of
conjecture. They are not susceptible of direct measurement in
pecuniary terms. Under the already announced legal rule for
the measure of damages, confining the inquiry to loss of profits
proved to a reasonable certainty, such items are too elusive, too
intangible, too indeterminate, too conjectural to be left to the
Jury.43  Leaving such matters for the jury to speculate upon
might indeed result in very capricious verdicts.
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that such items have reality,
that the reality of such items can make the entire difference
between failure and success, between dispair and hope, between
loss and profit for the indefinite time ahead whjch we refer to as
the future.
Without going into attempts to evaluate the more elusive
and indeterminate of the items mentioned, two elements, prospec-
tive future profits, and the burden and expense of litigation
may be segregated for particular emphasis. No lawyer or
judge will deny the very definite reality of the burden and
expense involved where an injured party must resort to litiga-
tion to secure his legal rights. Equally familiar and readily
recognizable though not as readily susceptible of accurate
measurement is the loss of prospective profitg. On the evidence
in the record in the case, above referred to,44 the jury found a
loss of profits for the interval of 1933-1936, covering roughly
42 Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 101 Fed.
(2d) 79, at p. 81 (limiting proof of recoverable damages to "only those
sustained by the plaintiff from the time the cause of action accrued up
to the time the suit was brought").
"See footnote 42, supra.
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two years and a half, amounting to $25,000, or about $10,000 per
year. According to the jury's verdict, the plaintiff was actually
out of pocket $10,000 for each ol those years involved by reason
of defendants' unlawful conduct. Had there been no unlawful
conduct plaintiff would have realized $10,000 per year more for
that interval. So far goes the verdict of the jury that heard the
evidence. Had there been no unlawful conduct, who knows for
how many years further into the future such advantageous
opportunities would have continued? Conjectural, to be sure,
such prospects for the future always are. They are subject to
eventualities and contingencies. For all that, however, just such
prospects are what keeps the business world moving. Destroy
such prospects, and collapse follows.
Even only a five year duration of such prospects without
startling change in the business outlook would in this case have
netted the plaintiff another $50,000. Extended beyond a bare
five year period it might have been very much more. For a
person who was in the plaintiff's position, an established dealer
owning a favorably located and well equipped place of business,
a person in middle life with many years' experience in the busi-
ness in question, a person who had survived the depression from
1929 to 1936, an expectancy of another five years without serious
change in his business position does not seem an extravagent con-
jecture. In fact, an expectancy of from ten to twenty years would
seem more probable. The vitality of such business expectancies
depend but little, if at all, on long time contracts. They depend
rather on the continuity of business opportunities in the free
and open market. Conjectural in some degree of course these
future profits are, however, and hence such prospective profits
are not "proved to a reasonable certainty" within the common
law rule as to the measure of damages. Under such circum-
stances, which, after all, are but typical of anti-trust violations
wherever found, it is not difficult to see what is the function
actually served by the threefold damage provision in the anti-
trust act. It affords liquidated compensation for such intangible,
indeterminate, accumulative harm to the injured party going
beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal damages, in cases where
the large-scale powerful monopolistic combination through
violations of the anti-trust act attempts to drive its small
competitors out of business.
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V. SPECIAL POLICY REGARDING EXTENT OF LIABILITY FOE
VIOLATION OiF ANTI-TRUST LAWS.
1. Special Provisions to Enlarge the Range of Liability for
The Wrongdoer.
The anti-trust statute, in addition to its provisions for
criminal penalties also specifically provides for a civil cause of
action for damages in favor of the injured party.4 5 Unlike the
civil legal redress to aggrieved parties in ordinary cases, more-
over, the anti-trust statute by two special provisions in its
damages section 40 specifically encourages the victims of such
practices to defend themselves by resorting to litigation. One of
these is the provision for awarding to the winning plaintiff not
only the technical court costs, but also reasonable attorneys' fees,
thereby throwing on the wrongdoing defendant in such cases,
a larger portion of the actual burdens of litigation involved in
securing legal redress. The other is the provision for award to
the plaintiff of threefold the legal damages sustained in his busi-
ness or property. This in actuality provides for a considerable
range of compensation for the loss of prospective profits and
other accumulative actual harm inflicted through destruction or
impairment of valuable intangible relations already adverted to,
whose superlative importance in a going business cannot be
gainsaid but which are too elusive to be reckoned in the ordi-
narily available measure of legal damages. In other words, the
threefold damage provision, even if completely disregarding any
possible deterrent aspect which it may have, is a limited but
practical device embodied in the anti-trust act which affords to
injured plaintiffs to that extent liquidated compensation for
actual harm inflicted. The statutory threefold damage provision
in encouraging injured victims to seek legal redress is thus
readily seen to embody a twofold aspect. In the first place, it
casts upon the wrongdoer responsibility for a considerable range
of accumulative intangible but actual harm inflicted upon his
victim, which under ordinary policies of the common law in other
types of cases would not be recognized as subjects for legal
redress. In the second place, it liquidates the compensation for
such accumulative actual harm in proportion to the legal
damages to business or property proved in the case. These are
"See footnotes 1 and 2 supra, with accompanying text.
"See footnote 2 supra, and accompanying text.
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special policies embodied in the anti-trust act which shift to the
large-scale monopolistically tending wrongdoer to a larger extent
than is customary for ordinary cases under the traditional
measure of recoverable legal damages both the burdens of litiga-
tion and the burdens of intangible harms inflicted by destruction
of the little victim's going business.
It detracts nothing from the reality of the foregoing analysis
of the provisions of the anti-trust act that the liability for three-
fold the ordinary legal damages may be thought of as affording
also an incidental deterrent additional to the criminal penalties
imposed by the statute upon violators. If the threefold damage
provision actually has any deterrent effect it to that extent, at
the same time, serves both as incentive liability to defendants
and as liquidated compensation for accumulative actual but
intangible harm to plaintiffs who prove ordinarily recoverable
legal damages in their business or property.
2. Reasons for Specially Enlarging the Range of Liability
for Wrongdoers in Anti-Trust Cases.
While this aspect of the anti-trust law is seldom dis-
cussed at length in the court opinions, the reasons which justify
these special policies are not far to seek. The great inequality
between violators and victims in these cases, the serious and pre-
ponderant character of the intangible elements of harm inflicted
when the wrongful conduct is directed at destruction of a going
business, the deliberate character of the wrongdoing under the
delusive appearances of legitimate competition, and the general
public interest in protection of the public against the conse-
quences of destruction of legitimate competition and the substi-
tution therefor of monopolistic practices-all these considerations
point to the desirability of these special policies for making the
anti-trust statute practically effective.
The large-scale, monopolistically inclined wrongdoer is
engaged in the process of crushing out his little victim, pursuant
to the unlawful practices seeking to establish monopolistic con-
trol of the market to the prejudice of the public. The anti-trust
statute provides for the injured party the 'emedy of threefold
the legal damages suffered in business or property. It also pro-
vides for his attorney's fees. By these provisions the anti-trust
act directly encourages injured victims of such monopolistic
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practices to assert their claims for legal redress. To that extent
it shifts the burdens caused by such unlawful monopolistic
practices from the little victim to the large-scale monopolistically
inclined wrongdoer. This is quite different in this respect from
the policy of the common law embodied in the ordinary doctrines
of proximate cause and measure of legal damages under which
litigation is discouraged through the rules of law which leave
the litigant in any event to bear a considerable part of the loss
and burdens actually resulting from the wrongdoing that is
called in question.
The extreme disparity between the parties in their relative
economic strength is such in these cases that were not the burdens
thrown upon guilty defendants in these cases to a greater extent
than is provided thxough the ordinarily recoverable legal
damages, such large-scale, guilty defendants could readily wear
down the plaintiffs by sheer delay and expensive litigation
carried through, in course of time, to the highest courts in the
country. Pursuing such practices, the large-scale, guilty
defendants could, under the ordinary rules for legal damages,
reduce every court victory for the little plaintiff to a Pyrrhic
victory which would cost him more in costs, expenses, delay,
inconvenience and interruption of regular work than the
amount of the recovery itself. Meanwhile the overwhelmingly
important accumulative intangible actual harm in the destruc-
tion of the little victim's business and loss of his future profits
and prospects would remain totally unrecompensed were redress
to be had only to the exent of ordinarily recoverable legal
damages. Under such circumstances, therefore, the private
action for damages would be practically nugatory. The special
provisions embodied in the statute for threefold damages and
attorney's fees, therefore, are indispensable to making the
private action effective as an instrument for enforcement of the
general policy of the anti-trust act.
VI. TH . MEANMG oF TnREEFoLD DATAGEs AS JuDiciALLY
INTERPRETED UNDER THE ANTI-TRuST AcT.
1. The Courts Interpret It As RemediaZ
Ratker Than PenaZ.
While the exact phraseology employed in the judicial
opinions is often inapt because of lack of complete analysis of the
K. L. J.-4
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concepts involved, the threefold damage provision in the anti-
trust act is not regarded by the courts as a penalty in the strict
sense. The courts treat it as partaking of the nature of burdens
imposed upon the wrongdoing defendent, provisions for which
in their various gradations have frequently been upheld as
remedial rather than penal provisions. Because of the impor-
tance of ascertaining as a matter of definite inquiry, instead of
starting in the instance from mere unexamined assumptions as
to what is in this regard the proper interpretation of the tbxee-
fold damage provision in the statute, it seems desirable to set out
in some detail how the federal statute has actually been inter-
preted in this regard.
2. How the Federal Courts Define "Penalty": Payment Goes
To the State: Liability to Party Aggrieved for
Accumulative Harm Is Not Penal.
Any discussion of the problem of what constitutes a
penalty, as the term is analyzed in the federal courts, inevitably
gets back to the leading case, Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S.
657, 36 Law. Ed. 1123, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 (1892). A state statute
subjected stockholders individually to liability for corporate
debts where their corporations failed to submit certain reports
as required, and making officers of such corporation who sub-
mitted false reports also individually liable for the corporate
debts. Attrill was a stockholder and officer. As officer he made
false reports. Huntington had a large claim against the corpo-
ration which he thereupon sought to enforce against Attrill
individually, the corporation being insolvent. He recovered
judgment against Attrill in New York. In seeking to enforce
this judgment against Attrill thereafter in the courts of Mary-
land, he encountered the contention that as the judgment was
for a penalty it was not enforceable outside of the state under
whose laws it was imposed. On appeal from the Maryland court
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the statutory
provision in question was not a penalty in that sense. In the
course of this opinion appears a rather extended discussion of
the various senses in which the term "penalty" is used, the most
significant portions of which have been referred to above.4 7
It is to be noted that these excerpts from opinions from the
47 See footnote 21, supra, with accompanying text.
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highest authority deal with two quite distinct aspects of the
inquiry which appear in close connection. One of these aspects
involves the question of who collects the exacted payment, the
state or the injured party. The other aspect involves the
question whether the payment collected is exacted of the defend-
ant merely by way of example to others, punitive or exemplary,
or whether it is exacted as compensation for harm actually
inflicted. In this connection, enhanced damages, double
damages, etc., are here designated as "accumulative damages"
which are awarded in order to provide liquidated compensation
for actual harm inflicted beyond the range of ordinarily recover-
able legal damages. While the term "accumulative damages" is
relatively uncommon in familiar, legal speech, its presence in
the opinion in HuNtington v. Attrill, supra, is in this connection
worth repetition here.
"As said by Mr. Justice Ashurst in the King's Bench, and repeated
by Mr. Justice Wilde in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
'It has been held, in many instances, that where a statute gives accumu-
lative damages to the party grieved, it is not a penal action."
It may be noted, too, that this very expression, "accumula-
tive damages" is the term employed to express the court's idea
of the realities in the case of the double damages statute which
was discussed in the opinion of Peck, J., in Burnett v. Ward,
42 Vt. 80 (1869), which is set out at greater length elsewhere in
this paper.48
These leading cases have authoritatively analyzed in con-
siderable detail the elements involved in "penalties" and
"damages". They have recognized how the two terms in con-
siderable range overlap. They have recognized that actual harm
inflicted may be far beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal
damages. These leading cases have been frequently referred
to in connection with the litigation directly upon the anti-trust
statute.
3. Interpretations of Threefold Damages in Anti-Trust
Cases in Application of Assignment and
Survival of Causes of Action.
There are numerous adjudications in which the question of
whether the threefold damage provision in the federal anti-trust
4See footnotes 12, 19, and 20, supra, with accompanying text.
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statute was to be regarded as a penalty has been discussed with
reference to the problem of assignment or survival of causes of
action under the statute. Without attempting here to discuss
in detail the merits of that question, it suffices to say that by
the large preponderance of authority such causes of action have
been held to survive and to be assignable.4 9
While in these groups of cases touching assignment and
survival of causes of action for threefold damages under the
anti-trust act, the question of whether that provision constitutes
a penalty is frequently referred to, the analysis of the concept
of what constitutes a penalty is itself most frequently either
entirely overlooked or is left in very great obscurity. It is
broadly recognized in these cases, however, that the provision
for threefold damages is not penal in the stricter sense, but the
gradations of the concept itself are seldom set out at length.
The case of Haskell v. Perkins,50 supra, among these cases,
seems to be the one whose language from this standpoint is most
hostile of all to the "threefold" provision. That case loosely
calls the threefold damage provision a penalty. Examination
of the opinion of the court in that case, however, discloses that
the conclusion reached rests upon an unexamined assumption
that cannot be maintained. The opinion of District Judge
Runyon at page 222 overlooks the elementary fact that legal
49 Holding such causes of action assignable, see, Hicks v. Bekins
Moving & Storage Co., 87 Fed. (2d) 583 (1937) (includes statement that
it is not a penalty); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574 (1916) (includes statement that it Is not a
penalty, but likened to exemplary damages); Kunihiro v. Lyons Bros.
Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 894 (1926); Imperial Film Exchange v. General Film
Co., 244 Fed. 985 (1915). Corresponding decisions that the cause of
action survives: Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 Fed. (2d)
885 (1934); Imperial Film Exchange v. General Film Co., 244 Fed. 985
(1915); Moore v. Backus, 78 Fed. (2d) 571, 101 A. L. R. 379 (1935);
Sullivan v. Associated Billposters and Distributors, 6 Fed. (2d) 1000
(1925) (calls it remedial rather than penal).
As may be expected, in view of the deep-seated ambiguities
inherent in the loose use of the term "damages" and the term "penalty,"
a few decisions to the contrary may also be found which have denied
survival or assignability in these situations, on the assumption without
adequate analysis that the provision was one for a penalty. See
Bonvillain v. American Sugar Refining Co., 250 Fed. 641 (1918) (calls
it analogous to common law action for deceit, which did not survive);
Caillouet v. American Sugar Refining Co., 250 Fed. 639 (1917) (calls It
analogous to fraud and deceit); and Haskell v. Perkins, 28 Fed. (2d)
222 (1928).
-28 Fed. (2d) 222 (1928).
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damages awarded by the jury do not fully compensate for the
entire harm that is suffered. Judge Runyon there says:
"But if, on the other hand, the damages as awarded by the jury
constitute in their entirety everything that is compensatory, then the
trebling of the damages and the attorneys' fee would appear to lie
entirely outside the scope of compensation."
Consequently the reasoning utterly ignores the element of
liquidating compensation for accumulative actual harm in the
intangible elements involved when a going business is destroyed
in violation of the anti-trust act. The opinion thus merely
blindly assumes that the threefold damage provision is merely
punitive.
It appeaes, further, from the quotations in this opinion from
the debates in congress, that Senator Hoar in charge of the bill
for the anti-trust act in the Senate before its enactment referred
to the threefold damage provision as a penalty. In considering
that argument, however, one should not forget the cautionary
rule that "statements in debate are of doubtful aid to the
construction of the statute." (From opinion of Simons, J., in
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 101
Fed. (2) 620, at p. 623.)
Again, moreover, this debating reference to the threefold
damage provision as a penalty was made without defining the
range of meaning for the word "penalty" which was used in
the instance. That the senator was using the term "penalty" in
the very broad and comprehensive sense of burdens for good
cause imposed upon defendants, and was not using it in its
strict sense, is from the context abundantly plain, however.
He specifically included in his broad description of "penalty"
not only the threefold damage provision but also the provision
for attorneys' fees, a matter which has often been held to be in
the nature of costs, and not a penalty.51 The context readily
shows, moreover, that the senator was not minutely analyzing
a legal concept, but was addressing his remark to the policy of
keeping the remedies under the federal statute within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. He was not in that connection
called upon to use terms with more precision or to define the
various senses in which the word "penalty" is loosely used.
Tle case of Hfaskell v. Perkins, supra, thus in its use of the
a See footnote No. 13, 8upra.
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terms not only fails to distinguish between ordinarily recover-
able legal damages and the broader range of accumulative
actual harm, but also fails to distinguish between the widest
and most indefinite meanings and the narrower and more
restricted meanings of the term "penalty." Under the cir-
cumstances, its choice of terminology with which to characterize
the threefold damage provision in the anti-trust act is worthy
of but slight if any weight.
4. Interpretations of Threefold Danages in Anti-Trust
Cases in Application of the Statute of
Limitations.
Another range of inquiry, regarding the nature of the
threefold damage provision in the federal anti-trust statute
concerns the running of the statute of limitations. Statutes of
limitations, as every lawyer knows, are various. Their provisions
are somewhat numerous and from one jurisdiction to another
the differentiations that are made are somewhat divergent. As
in the Nebraska statute of limitations, so in many others, a rela-
tively short period of limitation is provided for actions for the
recovery of penalties, while a relatively longer period is pro-
vided for actions of various other sorts. The threefold damage
provision in the federal statute has many times been dealt with
from the standpoint of whether in this regard it was to be
classified as a penalty or whether it fell within some period of
the statute of limitations blocked out on other grounds. Since
statutes of limitations in different jurisdictions vary somewhat,
the exact points of demarcation in the various cases do not
always exactly correspond. However, the cases quite generally
hold that for purposes of the statute of limitations, other clauses
of the statute are controlling rather than the clause fixing the
period of limitation for penalties. 52
52See H. J. Jaeger Research Laboratories, Inc. v. Radio Corporation
of America, 90 Fed. (2d) 826 (1937) (classified as falling under the six
year clause); City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works,
101 Fed. 900 (not a penalty in strict sense, but classified as falling
within the clause for injuries to real and personal property); City of
Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works, 127 Fed. 23 (1903)(classified as statute liability); Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 59 Law. Ed. 241 (1906) (not a penalty
in the strict sense, but classified as falling within the general clause);
Foster and Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 Fed. (2d) 742 (1936)(classified as a statutory liability); Baugh Machine and Tool Co. v.
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The most outspoken characterization of the nature of the
action which appears in this group of cases is that of Clark,
D. J., in City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co.,
101 Fed. 900, at p. 906, as follows:
"It would be unusual to discover that a statute inflicted punish-
ment for infringement of its provisions by a fine and imprisonment, or
either, and again in the form of a pecuniary penalty for the same act.
A sound rule of interpretation would be that when a statute inflicts
punishment by way of fine and imprisonment at the suit of the state
for a public wrong affecting the whole community, and also confers a
remedy on a party for private injuries resulting from breaches of the
statute, the latter will not be regarded as a penalty unless the statute
so declares. * * * These and other characteristic points of dif-
ference between penal and remedial actions support the conclusions
arrived at that these actions are remedial and compensatory only."
5. Analogous Interpretations of Threefold Damages
Provisions in Patent and Copyright Laws.
In addition to the cases just referred to, which were under
the anti-trust act itself, the statutory provisions for treble
damages in connection with infringement of patents have on
various occasions received a treatment very similar. Here again,
the word "penalty" is frequently in discussion used very
loosely.5 3 Especially significant expressions from the leading
cases in the patent field are the following:
"'In the nature of a penalty' is a somewhat nebulous phrase, and
might as appropriately be applied to damages in an action on the case,
based upon ordinary negligence or an ordinary breach of duty to the
plaintiff. * * *
"* * * Any recovery of dainges may well be said to be 'in the
nature of a penalty,' when the defendant is required to pay for his
breach of duty."
Standard Oil Co. v. Roxana Petroleum Corporation, 9 Fed. (2)
453 (1925) (Fitzhenry, District Judge).
Aluminum Company of America, 79 Fed. (2d) 217, 227 (1935) (classified
as falling under the six year clause); Sheldon Electric Co. v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., 277 Fed. 433 (1922) ("neither a penalty or a
forfeiture, but merely treble damages allowed by the law for the
redress of a private injury"); Harvey v. Booth Fisheries Co., 223 Fed.
782 (1915) ("the right of recovery under Sec. 7 * * * is private
and remedial"). For a special problem of this sort under the pro-
visions of the statute of limitations of Kentucky, see Northern Ken-
tucky Telephone and Telegraph Co., 73 Fed. (2d) 333, 97 A. L. R. 133
(1934).
5 That such treble damage provisions are not penal but remedial,
see: Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Owen, 293 Fed. 759 (1923);
Standard Oil Co. v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 9 Fed. (2d) 453 (1925);
Beacon Folding Mach. Co. v. Rotary Mach. Co., 17 Fed. (2d) 934 (1927).
Contra, see: Wilson v. Union Tool Co., 275 Fed. 624 (1921). See also:
Standard Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 21 Fed. (2d) 159 (1927).
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"Whatever the defendant is obliged to pay beyond the profits which
he unlawfully received is in a sense punishment as to him, but it is also
remedial as to the plaintiff. The punitive element, however, must be
regarded as incidental to the remedy. The underlying purpose of the
statute is to prQvide adequate compensation for the injury sustained
by infringement of patent rights, where the strict rules of law would
not afford it. In the field of patent litigation it is difficult to measure
with mathematical accuracy a plaintiff's damages, and a statement that
all over legal damages is punitive rather than remedial may, as an
abstract proposition, be true, but it would rarely be so as a statement
of experience."
Beacon Folding Machine Co. v. Rotary Machine Co., 17 Fed.
(2d) 934 (1927) at p. 935 (Brewster, J.).
Similar conclusions have been frequently expressed in con-
nection with analogous provisions in the copyright laws, holding
such provisions to be in their nature compensatory and remedial
rather than penal. See, A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing
Co., 249 U. S. 100, 108, 109, 39 Sup. Ct. 194, 63 Law. Ed. 499,
503. Quoting from a prior case, Mr. Justice Van Devanter
states:
"'The idea of the punishment of the wrongdoer is not so much sug-
gested by the language used in the statute as is a desire to provide for
the recovery by the proprietor of full compensation from the wrongdoer
for the damages such proprietor has sustained from the wrongful act
of the latter. In the face of the difficulty of determining the amount
of such damages in all cases, the statute provides a minimum sum for a
recovery in any case, leaving it open for a larger recovery upon proof
of greater damage in those cases where such proof can be made. The
statute does not speak of punishment or penalties, but refers entirely
to damages suffered by the wrongful act. * * *
"'Although punishment, in a certain and very limited sense, may
be the result of the statute before us so far as the wrongdoer is con-
cerned, yet we think it clear such is not its chief purpose, which is the
award of damages to the party who had sustained them, and the mini-
mum amount appears to us to have been fixed because of the inherent
difficulty of always proving by satisfactory evidence what the amount
is which has been actually sustained.'"
See also Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207, 79 Law. Ed.
862, 55 Sup. Ct. 365 (1935), opinion by Judge Roberts:
"The phraseology of the section was adopted to avoid the strictness
of construction incident to a law imposing penalties, and to give the
owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done him, in a case
where the rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages
or discovery of profits. In this respect the old law was unsatisfactory.
In many cases plaintiffs, though proving infringement, were able to
recover only nominal damages, in spite of the fact that preparation and
trial of the case imposed substantial expense and inconvenience. The
ineffectiveness of the remedy encouraged wilful and deliberate Infringe-
ment. * * *
"In other words, the employment of the statutory yardstick, within
set limits, is committed solely to the court which hears the case, and
this fact takes the matter out of the ordinary rule with respect to abuse
of discretion."
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6. The Threefold Damage Provision in the Anti-Trust Act
Is Dependent Upon Proof of Legal Damages
to Business or Property.
That the threefold damage provision in the anti-trust act,
instead of being penal, rather provides liquidated compensation
for accumulative, actual harm going beyond the ordinarily
recoverable legal damages, is readily observable from another
angle. It is provided in the damage section 54 of the anti-trust
act that the party who is "injured in his business or property"
by the defendant's violation of the anti-trust act, may recover
threefold damages. The legal damage against which the statute
thus in the first instance provides redress is the damage in
"business or property." Other harm, aside from such legal
damage, is not independently recognized. Under the provi-
sions of the anti-trust act definite proof of ordinarily recoverable
legal damages to the business of the property is thus required
as a starting base, the guaranty of genuineness of the harm
claimed. In this respect the statutory situation under the anti-
trust act somewhat closely resembles the position familiar in the
older cases on recovery for injury through emotional distress,
which required, as a starting point, proof of bodily impact, to
assure the genuineness of the claims asserted.5 5 If the legal
damages to business or property for which the statute provides
redress is made out, the threefold damage provision is operative
to afford the injured plaintiff more complete compensation for
the wider range of accumulative intangible harm, which is
reckoned by the threefold provision with reference to the
amount of proved legal damage to the business or property.
As more at length elsewhere expounded in this paper (Sub-
division IV, pp. -), the wrongdoing involved in driving
another out of business in violation of the anti-trust act com-
monly involves little or no direct physical damage to person
or tangible property. The harm sustained consists predominant-
ly in intangible elements. It is apparent, therefore, that for
full compensation for such harm the ordinary measure of legal
damages is utterly inadequate. Giving the injured party
5 See footnote 2, supra.U See Holmes, J., in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 186 Mass. 285,
71 N. E. 66 (1897), and in Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180
Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902).
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redress under the threefold provision thus provides for sub-
stantial compensation for such intangible harm while the
amount recovered therefor is reckoned in proportion to the
legal damages actually proven. The provision for threefold
the legal damages in business or property thus while providing
more complete compensation, at the same time avoids the danger
of complete indefiniteness with regard to the bounds of recovery
in such cases, which would otherwise be encountered if redress
beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal damages should be
awarded.
While this aspect of the matter is nowhere discussed at
length in the judicial materials, the distinctions involved in it
have been repeatedly and clearly recognized. Among the most
conveniently available materials are the following:
"Such an action as this under the Sherman Act can only be brought
when a person is 'injured in his business or property.' Sec. 7. The
action is to recover threefold the damages by him sustained, i. e., sus-
tained by and in the said 'business' or 'property.' Such an action as
this might well be called sui generis.
Imperial Film Exch. v. General Film Co., 244 Fed. 985 (1915)
at p. 987 (Hough, District Judge).
"The provisions above quoted are clearly remedial. They give a
cause of action to any 'person' 'injured in his business or property' by
reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the act,
and they declare that 'a person' 'so injured shall recover threefold' 'the
damages by him sustained."'
Sullivan v. Associated Billposters and Distributors, 6 Fed. (2)
1000 (1925) (Rogers, Circuit Judge).
"It may be that it (i. e., the term 'property') has a broader mean-
ing than was intimated below, and that some wrongs are within it
besides physical damage to tangible property. But there is a sufficient-
ly clear distinction between injuries to property and 'injured in his
business or property,' the latter being the language of the act of
congress."
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390,
51 Law. Ed. 241 (1906) at p. 245 (Holmes, J.).
"It should be stated at the outset that 'Section 7 of the Anti-Trust
Act gives a right of action to one who has been "injured in his business
or property."' Again, 'Recovery cannot be had unless it is shown, that,
as a result of defendant's acts, damages in some amount susceptible of
expression in figures resulted. These damages must be proved by facts
from which their existence is logically and legally inferable. They can-
not be supplied by conjecture."
Ebeling v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 12 Fed. Supp. 489 (1935) at p.
490, citing Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern By. Co., 260
U. S. 156, 43 S. Ct. 47, 67 Law. Ed. 183 (Neterer, D. J.).
On the other hand, if no legal damages "in his business or
property" are proved in cases under the anti-trust statute, mere
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outside intangible harm that may have been involved, even
though serious and substantial, is insufficient to ground an
action.56
7. The Threefold Damage Provision Affords Liquidated Com-
pensatiom for Accumulative Actual Harm Going Beyond
Ordinarily Recoverable Legal Damages Rather Than
Being a Provision for Exemplary Damages at
Jury's Discretion.
It is clear, under this array of judicial experience under
the federal anti-trust acts, that the threefold damage provision
is not a penalty, using the term "penalty" in its stricter senses.
It is not a penalty in the sense of Huntington v. Attrill,57 a pay-
ment by the wrongdoer to the state as punishment for a crime
committed, either for vengeance or for a deterrent example to
others. It is not a penalty in the sense of ordinary exemplary
damages, for it is not a payment by the wrongdoer to the indi-
vidual aggrieved, assessed by the jury in amount reflecting the
jury's moral indignation, as a deterrent example to others
It is not even a penalty in the milder sense of a statutory incen-
tive liability, unless merely incidentally so, for the realities in its
application in anti-trust cases include so predominantly large a
range of accumulative actual harm as in ordinary cases far to
exceed the ordinarily recoverable legal damages.
In other words, closely analyzed, the threefold damage pro-
vision is remedial to the plaintiff, compensatory in its nature in
1 See: Rossman v. Pullman Co., 15 Fed. Supp. 325 (1936) (no proof
of damage to a property interest); Ebeling v. Foster & Kleiser Co.,
12 Fed. Supp. 489 (1935); Krigbaum v. Sparbaro, 23 Calif. App. 427,
136 Pac. 364 (1913) (loss of prospective profitable contract, but no
damage "in his business or property"); Clabaugh v. Southern Whole-
sale Grocers' Assn., 181 Fed. 706 (1910); Central Coal and Coke Co. v.
Hartman, 111 Fed. 96 (1901) (legal damages claimed being too con-
jectural to support verdict, threefold damages has nothing to operate
upon); Gerli v. Silk Assn. of America, 36 Fed. (2d) 959 (1929) (loss of
corporate office and salary held not to entitle a party who had no inde-
pendent business or property to recover threefold damages); Paine
Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 61 Law. Ed. 1256, 37 Sup. Ct. 718
(1917) (under the Clayton Act) (majority of court, by Holmes, J., finds
special damages not proved); Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Story
Parchment Co., 37 Fed. (2d) 537 (1930) (mere loss of profits on pro-
spective future contracts in a field where plaintiff was without any
record of past experience to serve as a standard held too conjectural
to be recognized).
5 See footnote 47, supra, with accompanying text.
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liquidating compensation for accumulative intangible harm
incurred outside of and beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal
damages to the business or property. It is a penalty upon the
defendant only in the loose sense of penalty as signifying a
burden encountered by the defendant as a consequence of his
wrongdoing. In that broad sense of penalty this provision of
course is a burden to the defendant in requiring him to make
compensation for damage wrongfully caused, comparable to the
burden that is imposed by every provision which imposes legal
liability to make compensation to the injured party. The three-
fold damage provision is a provision for liquidated compensation
for accumulative harm, largely intangible in its nature, which is
so conspicuous a part of the loss suffered when a going business
is destroyed in violation of the anti-trust act.
It is very significant, that in the numerous foregoing appli-
cations which have been set out whenever any differences between
the merely punitive and the compensatory attributes of the
remedy have become in any wise material in the instance, the
compensatory and reparatory aspect of the threefold damage
provision in the anti-trust act has been by the courts insistently
emphasized as characteristic and controlling, while the resulting
burden to the defendant from such liability is treated as
incidental.
It is thus very clear that the threefold damage provision as
used in the federal anti-trust act is not a provision for a penalty,
using that term in the strict sense of a payment exacted and
collected by thie state as a punishment by way of example to
deter other evildoers. The available decisions have not had to
distinguish this provision sharply from exemplary damages at
the jury's discretion, or from statutory incentive liability, no
legal obstacle to the validity of such liabilities being encountered
in most jurisdictions. In numerous incidental applications
heretofore set out, however, where such, inquiry was collaterally
involved, as in connection with assignment and survival of
causes of action, and the running of the statute of limitations,
etc., the courts have clearly indicated that they were cognizant
of the compensatory and remedial elements in the threefold
damage provision, albeit usually without analyzing those ele-
ments in elaborate detail.
There is no reason to suppose that any state legislature, in
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enacting this identical section of the anti-trust statute to make
this section applicable to intrastate business falling under the
local anti-trust act as well as to interstate business falling under
the federal statutes, intended to use this language in any other
sense than that which was and is attached to the very same words
of the very same section of the federal anti-trust act. As already
shown, the threefold damage provision is here compensatory in
its nature, in liquidating compensation for accumulative intan-
gible harm going beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal dam-
ages to the business or property.
